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Efficient Constant Round Multi-Party Computation
Combining BMR and SPDZ∗
Yehuda Lindell† Benny Pinkas† Nigel P. Smart‡ Avishay Yanai†
Abstract
Recently, there has been huge progress in the field of concretely efficient secure computation,
even while providing security in the presence of malicious adversaries. This is especially the
case in the two-party setting, where constant-round protocols exist that remain fast even over
slow networks. However, in the multi-party setting, all concretely efficient fully-secure protocols,
such as SPDZ, require many rounds of communication.
In this paper, we present a constant-round multiparty secure computation protocol that is
fully-secure in the presence of malicious adversaries and for any number of corrupted parties.
Our construction is based on the constant-round protocol of Beaver et al. (the BMR protocol),
and is the first version of that protocol that is concretely efficient for the dishonest majority case.
Our protocol includes an online phase that is extremely fast and mainly consists of each
party locally evaluating a garbled circuit. For the offline phase we present both a generic
construction (using any underlying MPC protocol), and a highly efficient instantiation based
on the SPDZ protocol. Our estimates show the protocol to be considerably more efficient than
previous fully-secure multi-party protocols.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Prior Work
Protocols for secure multi-party computation (MPC) enable a set of mutually distrustful parties
to securely compute a joint functionality of their inputs. Such a protocol must guarantee pri-
vacy (meaning that only the output is learned), correctness (meaning that the output is correctly
computed from the inputs), and independence of inputs (meaning that each party must choose its
input independently of the others). Formally, security is defined by comparing the distribution
of the outputs of all parties in a real protocol to an ideal model where an incorruptible trusted
party computes the functionality for the parties. The two main types of adversaries that have been
considered are semi-honest adversaries who follow the protocol specification but try to learn more
than allowed by inspecting the transcript, and malicious adversaries who can run any arbitrary
strategy in an attempt to break the protocol. Secure MPC has been studied since the late 1980s,
and powerful feasibility results were proven showing that any two-party or multi-party function-
ality can be securely computed [32, 14], even in the presence of malicious adversaries. When an
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honest majority (or a 2/3 majority) is assumed, security can even be obtained information theo-
retically [5, 6, 30]. In this paper, we focus on the problem of obtaining security in the presence of
malicious adversaries, and a dishonest majority.
Recently, there has been much interest in the problem of concretely efficient secure MPC,
where “concretely efficient” refers to protocols that are sufficiently efficient to be implemented in
practice (in particular, these protocols should not, say, use generic ZK proofs that operate on
the circuit representation of these primitives). In the last few years there has been tremendous
progress on this problem, and there now exist extremely fast protocols that can be used in practice;
see [23, 24, 26, 22, 12] for just a few examples. In general, there are two approaches that have been
followed; the first uses Yao’s garbled circuits [32] and the second utilizes interaction for every gate
like the GMW protocol [14].
There are extremely efficient variants of Yao’s protocol for the two party case that are secure
against malicious adversaries (e.g., [23, 24]). These protocols run in a constant number of rounds
and therefore remain fast over high latency networks. The BMR protocol [1, 31] is a variant of
Yao’s protocol that runs in a multi-party setting with more than two parties. This protocol works
by the parties jointly constructing a garbled circuit (possibly in an offline phase), and then later
computing it (possibly in an online phase). However, in the case of malicious adversaries, the
original BMR protocol suffers from two main drawbacks:
• The protocol uses circuit-based zero-knowledge proofs to ensure that the parties input correct
values obtained from the pseudorandom generator in the protocol. This requires a very large
proof (of a circuit computing a pseduorandom generator) for every gate of the circuit. Thus,
the protocol serves as a feasbility result for achieving constant-round MPC, but cannot be
run in practice.
• The original BMR protocol only guarantees security for malicious adversaries if at most a
minority of the parties are corrupt. This is due to the fact that constant-round protocols for
multiparty commitment, coin-tossing and zero-knowledge were not known at the time for the
setting of dishonest majority. The existence of constant-round protocols for multiparty secure
computation in the presence of a dishonest majority was proven later in [18, 27]. However,
these too are feasibility results and are not concretely efficient.
The TinyOT and SPDZ protocols [26, 12] follow the GMW paradigm, and have separate offline
and online phases. Both of these protocols overcome the issues of the BMR protocols in that
they are secure against any number of corrupt parties, make only black-box usage of cryptographic
primitives and have very fast online phases that require only very simple (information theoretic)
operations. A black-box constant-round MPC construction for the case of an honest majority
appears in [9] and for the case of a dishonest majority in [17], however, their construction appears
to be “concretely inefficient”. In a setting of more than two parties these protocols are currently
the only practical approach known. However, since they follow the GMW paradigm, their online
phase requires a communication round for each level of the circuit. This results in a large amount
of interaction and high latency, especially when the parties wish to compute deep circuits over slow
networks (e.g. the Internet). To sum up, prior to this work, there was no known concretely efficient
constant-round protocol for the multiparty and dishonest majority setting (with the exception of
[7] that considers the specific three-party case only). We therefore address this setting.
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1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we provide the first concretely-efficient constant-round protocol for the general mul-
tiparty case, with security in the presence of malicious adversaries and a dishonest majority. Our
protocol has 12 communication rounds, of which only 3 rounds are in the online phase. This makes
it much more efficient than prior protocols [26, 12] for deep circuits and/or slow networks, since
prior works all have a number of rounds that is (at least) the depth of the circuit being computed.
The basic idea behind the construction is to use an efficient (either constant or non-constant round)
protocol, with security for malicious adversaries, to compute the gate tables of the BMR garbled
circuit (and since the computation of these tables is of constant depth, this step is constant round).
Our main conceptual contribution, resulting in a great performance improvement, is to show that
it is not necessary for the parties to prove (expensive) zero-knowledge proofs that they used the
correct pseudorandom generator values in the offline circuit generation phase. Rather, validation
of the correctness is an immediate byproduct of the online computation phase, and therefore does
not add any overhead to the computation. Although our basic generic protocol can be instantiated
with any MPC protocol (either constant or non-constant round), we provide an optimized version
that utilizes specific features of the SPDZ protocol [12].
In our general construction, the new constant-round protocol consists of two phases. In the first
(offline) phase, the parties securely compute random shares of the BMR garbled circuit. If this is
done naively, then the result is highly inefficient since part of the computation involves computing a
pseudorandom generator or a pseudorandom function multiple times for every gate. By modifying
the original BMR garbled circuit, we show that it is possible to actually compute the circuit very
efficiently. Specifically, each party locally computes the pseudorandom function as needed for every
gate1 and uses the results as input to the secure computation. Our proof of security shows that if
a party cheats and inputs incorrect values then no harm is done, since this only causes the honest
parties to abort (which is inevitable in the dishonest majority anyway). Next, in the online phase,
all that the parties need to do is reconstruct the single garbled circuit, exchange garbled values on
the input wires and evaluate compute the garbled circuit. The online phase is therefore very fast.
In our concrete instantiation of the protocol using SPDZ [12], there are actually three separate
phases, with each being faster than the previous. The first two phases can be run offline, and the
last phase is run online after the inputs become known.
• The first (slow) phase depends only on an upper bound on the number of wires and the
number of gates in the function to be evaluated. This phase uses Somewhat Homomorphic
Encryption (SHE) and is equivalent to the offline phase of the SPDZ protocol.
• The second phase depends on the function to be evaluated but not on the function inputs;
in our proposed instantiation this mainly involves information theoretic primitives and is
equivalent to the online phase of the SPDZ protocol.
• In the third phase the parties provide their inputs and evaluate the function; this phase just
involves exchanging shares of the circuit and garbled values on the input wires and locally
evaluate the BMR garbled circuit.
We stress that our protocol is constant round in all phases since the depth of the circuit
required to compute the BMR garbled circuit is constant. In addition, the computational cost of
1In our construction we use a pseudorandom function as opposed to a pseudorandom generator used in the original
BMR [1].
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preparing the BMR garbled circuit is not much more than the cost of using SPDZ itself to compute
the functionality directly. However, the key advantage that we gain is that our online time is
extraordinarily fast, requiring only two rounds and a local computation of a single garbled circuit.
This is faster than all other existing circuit-based multi-party protocols.
Finite field optimization of BMR. In order to efficiently compute the BMR garbled circuit,
we define the garbling and evaluation operations over a finite field. A similar technique of using
finite fields in the BMR protocol was introduced in [2] in the case of semi-honest security with an
honest majority. In contrast to [2], our utilization of finite fields is carried out via vectors of field
elements, and uses the underlying arithmetic of the field as opposed to using very large finite fields
to simulate integer arithmetic. This makes our modification in this respect more efficient.
Subsequent Work. Following our work, there has been renewed interest in the BMR protocol.
First and foremost, the works of [25, 16] build directly on this work and show how to construct the
BMR garbled circuit more efficiently. In addition, [3] considered the semi-honest setting, and [21]
apply an optimized version of our construction to efficient RAM-based MPC. The fact that constant-
round BMR protocol outperform secret-sharing based protocols for not-shallow circuits and slow
(Internet-like) networks has been demonstrated in [3, 4, 21].
1.3 Paper Structure
In Section 2 we give a detailed description of the BMR protocol. In Section 3 we present our
general protocol, that can utilize any MPC protocol for arithmetic circuits as a subprocedure.
Then, in Section 4, we describe our specific BMR protocol that uses SPDZ [12] as the underlying
MPC protocol, and we analyze its complexity. We utilize specific properties of SPDZ for further
optimizations, in order to obtain an even more efficient evaluation. Finally, we provide a full proof
of our construction in Section 5.
2 Background – the BMR Protocol [1]
We outline the basis of our protocol, which is the protocol of Beaver, Micali and Rogaway against
a semi-honest adversary2. The protocol is comprised of an offline-phase and an online-phase. In the
offline-phase the garbled circuit is constructed by the parties, while in the online-phase a matching
set of garbled inputs is exchanged between the parties and each party evaluates it locally.
We now describe the main elements of the BMR protocol. Let κ denote the computational
security parameter, n denote the number of parties, and let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. The wires in the
circuit that computes the function f are indexed 0, . . . ,W − 1. The protocol is based on the
following key components:
Seeds and superseeds. Two random seeds are associated with each wire in the circuit by each
party. We denote the 0-seed and 1-seed that are chosen by party Pi (i ∈ [n]) for wire w as siw,0 and
siw,1 such that s
i
w,j ∈ {0, 1}κ. During the garbling process the parties produce two superseeds for
2Their original work also offers a version against a malicious adversary, however, it requires an honest majority
and is not concretely efficient.
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each wire, where the 0-superseed and 1-superseed for wire w are a simple concatenation of the 0-
seeds and 1-seeds chosen by all the parties, namely, Sw,0 = s
1
w,0‖ · · · ‖snw,0 and Sw,1 = s1w,1‖ · · · ‖snw,1
where ‖ denotes concatenation. Denote L = |Sw,j | = n · κ.
Garbling wire values. For each gate g that calculates the function fg (where fg : {0, 1} ×
{0, 1} → {0, 1}), the garbled gate of g is computed such that the superseeds associated with the
output wire are encrypted (via a simple XOR) using the superseeds associated with the input wires,
according to the truth table of fg. Specifically, a superseed Sw,0 = s
1
w,0‖ · · · ‖snw,0 is used to encrypt




w,0), where G is a pseudo-random generator
stretching a seed of length κ to an output of length L. This means that every one of the seeds that
make up the superseed must be known in order to learn the mask and decrypt.
Masking values. Using random seeds instead of the original 0/1 values does not hide the original
value if it is known that the first seed corresponds to 0 and the second seed to 1. Therefore, an
unknown random masking bit, denoted by λw, is assigned to each wire w independently. These
masking bits remain unknown to the parties during the entire protocol, thereby preventing them
from knowing the real values ρw that actually pass through the wires. The values that the parties do
know are called the external values, denoted Λw. An external value is defined to be the exclusive-or
of the real value and the masking value; i.e., Λw = ρw ⊕ λw. When evaluating the garbled circuit
the parties only see the external values of the wires, which are random bits that reveal nothing
about the real values, unless they know the masking values. We remark that each party Pi is given
the masking value associated with its input, hence, it can compute the external value itself (based
on its actual input) and can send it to all other parties.
BMR garbled gates and circuit. We can now define the BMR garbled circuit, which consists
of the set of garbled gates, where a garbled gate is defined via a functionality that maps inputs











c,1. Thus, the appropriate superseeds are Sa,0, Sa,1, Sb,0, Sb,1, Sc,0, Sc,1, where
each superseed is given by Sα,β = s
1
α,β‖ · · · ‖snα,β. In addition, Pi also inputs the output of a pseudo-










The output is the garbled gate of g which comprised of a table of four ciphertexts, each of them
encrypting either Sc,0 or Sc,1. The property of the gate construction is that given one superseed for
wire a and one superseed for wire b it is possible to to decrypt exactly one ciphertext, and reveal
the appropriate superseed for c (based on the values on the input wires and the gate type). The
functionality, garble-gate-BMR, for garbling a single gate, is formally described in Functionality 1.
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Functionality 1 (garble-gate-BMR).
Let κ denote the security parameter, and let G : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}2nκ be a pseudo-random gener-
ator. Denote the first L = n · κ bits of the output of G by G1, and the last nκ bits of the output
of G by G2.
The garbling of gate g computing fg : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1} with inputs wires a, b and output
wire c is defined as follows:
Inputs: For each gate the inputs are given by
• Seeds: Party Pi inputs uniform six,b ∈ {0, 1}κ for x ∈ {a, b, c} and b ∈ {0, 1}.
• Stretched seeds: Party Pi inputs the L-bit strings Υ̃ix,b and Υix,b for x ∈ {a, b, c} and
b ∈ {0, 1}. (If Pi is honest then Υ̃ix,b = G1(six,b) and Υix,b = G2(six,b); i.e. Υ̃ix,b and Υix,b are
the output of the pseudorandom generator G on the seed six,b).
• Masking bits. Party Pi inputs a uniform λix ∈ {0, 1} for x ∈ {a, b, c}.




x for x ∈ {a, b, c}. Then
set Sc,A = (fg(λa, λb) = λc?Sc,0 : Sc,1), Sc,B =
(
fg(λa, λ̄b) = λc?Sc,0 : Sc,1
)
, Sc,C =(




fg(λ̄a, λ̄b) = λc?Sc,0 : Sc,1
)
, The garbled gate of g is the
following four ciphertexts Ag, Bg, Cg, Dg (in this order that is determined by the external values):
Ag = Υ̃
1
a,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Υ̃na,0 ⊕ Υ̃1b,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Υ̃nb,0 ⊕ Sc,A
Bg = Υ
1
a,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Υna,0 ⊕ Υ̃1b,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Υ̃nb,1 ⊕ Sc,B
Cg = Υ̃
1
a,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Υ̃na,1 ⊕Υ1b,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Υnb,0 ⊕ Sc,C
Dg = Υ
1
a,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Υna,1 ⊕Υ1b,1)⊕ · · · ⊕Υnb,1 ⊕ Sc,D
The BMR Online Phase. In the online-phase the parties only have to obtain one superseed
for every circuit-input wire, and then every party can evaluate the circuit on its own, without
interaction with the rest of the parties. Formally, Protocol 1 realize the online-phase.
Protocol 1 (Protocol BMR-online-phase).
Step 1 – send values:
1. Every party Pi broadcasts the external values on the wires associated with its input.
At the end of this step the parties know the external value Λw for every circuit-input
wire w. (Recall that Pi knows λw and so can compute Λw based on its input.)
2. Every party Pi broadcasts one seed for each circuit-input wire, namely, the Λw-seed.
At the end of this step the parties know the Λw-superseed for every circuit-input wire.
Step 1 – evaluate circuit: The parties evaluate the circuit from bottom up, such that to obtain
the superseed of an output wire of the gate, use Ag if the external values of g’s input wires
are Λa,Λb = (0, 0), use Bg if Λa,Λb = (0, 1), Cg if Λa,Λb = (1, 0) and Dg if Λa,Λb = (1, 1)
where a, b are the input wires of that gate (see [1] for more details).
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Correctness. We explain now why the conditions for masking Sc,0 and Sc,1 are correct. The
external values Λa,Λb indicate to the parties which ciphertext to decrypt. Specifically, the parties
decrypt Ag if Λa = Λb = 0, they decrypt Bg if Λa = 0 and Λb = 1, they decrypt Cg if Λa = 1 and
Λb = 0, and they decrypt Dg if Λa = Λb = 1.
We need to show that given Sa,Λa and Sb,Λb , the parties obtain Sc,Λc . Consider the case that
Λa = Λb = 0 (note that Λa = 0 means that λa = ρa, and Λa = 1 means that λa 6= ρa, where ρa is
the real value). Since ρa = λa and ρb = λb we have that fg(λa, λb) = fg(ρa, ρb). If fg(λa, λb) = λc
then by definition fg(ρa, ρb) = ρc, and so we have λc = ρc and thus Λc = 0. Thus, the parties
obtain Sc,0 = Sc,Λc . In contrast, if fg(λa, λb) 6= λc then by definition fg(ρa, ρb) 6= ρc, and so we
have λc = ρ̄c and thus Λc = 1. A similar analysis show that the correct values are encrypted for all
other combinations of Λa,Λb.
Broadcast. As described in Protocol 1, in the online-phase the parties are instructed to broadcast
one key per input wire. In the semi-honest setting broadcasting a value simply takes one commu-
nication round in which the sender sends its value to all other parties3. However, in the malicious
setting a corrupted sender may send the value v to one party and a different value v′ 6= v to another
party. In the setting of t < n/3 corrupted parties fully secure broadcast (without abort) can be
achieved in an expected constant number of rounds [13] (or deterministically in t rounds [28]). In
the setting of t ≥ n/3 corrupted parties, and in particular with no honest majority at all, fully
secure broadcast (without abort) can only be achieved using a public-key infrastructure and with t
rounds of communication. However, we do not actually need a fully secure broadcast, since we allow
an adversary to cause some parties to abort. Thus, we can use a simple two-round echo-broadcast
protocol; this has been shown to be sufficient for secure computation with abort [15] (and even
UC secure). In more detail, the echo-broadcast works by having the sender send its message v to
all parties P1, . . . , Pn in the first round, and then every party Pi sends (echoes) the value that it
received in the first round to all other parties. If any party received two different values, then it
aborts. Otherwise, it outputs the unique value that it saw. It is not difficult to show that if the
dealer is honest, then all honest parties either output the dealer’s message v or abort (but no other
value can be output). Furthermore, if the dealer is dishonest, then there is a unique value v such
that every honest party either outputs v or aborts. See [15] for more details. We therefore write
our protocol assuming a broadcast channel, and utilize the above protocol to achieve broadcast in
the point-to-point setting. As a result, our protocol has a constant number of rounds even in the
point-to-point model.
3 The General Protocol
3.1 A Modified BMR Garbling
In order to facilitate fast secure computation of the garbled circuit in the offline phase, we make
some changes to the original BMR garbling described above. First, instead of using the XOR of bit
strings, and hence a binary circuit to instantiate the garbled gate, we use additions of elements in
a finite field, and hence an arithmetic circuit. This idea was used by [2] in the FairplayMP system,
which used the BGW protocol [5] in order to compute the BMR circuit. Note that FairplayMP
achieved semi-honest security with an honest majority, whereas our aim is malicious security for
3We assume that the parties interact over a point-to-point network.
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any number of corrupted parties. Consequently, we naturally replace the seeds six,b, which are bit-
strings input to a pseudorandom generator, that the parties input with keys kix,b, which are field
elements input to a pseudorandom function.
Second, we observe that the external values of wires4 do not need to be explicitly encoded, since
each party can learn them by looking at its own “part” of the garbled value. In the original BMR
garbling, each superseed contains n seeds provided by the parties. Thus, if a party’s zero-seed is in
the decrypted superseed then it knows that the external value (denoted by Λ) is zero, and otherwise
it knows that it is one.
Naively, it seems that independently computing each gate securely in the offline phase is insuf-
ficient, since the corrupted parties might use inconsistent inputs for the computations of different
gates. For example, if the output wire of gate g is an input to gate g′, the input provided for
the computation of the table of g might not agree with the inputs used for the computation of
the table of g′. It therefore seems that the offline computation must verify the consistency of the
computations of different gates. This type of verification would greatly increase the cost since the
evaluation of the pseudorandom functions (or pseudorandom generator in the original BMR) used
in computing the tables needs to be checked inside the secure computation. This would mean that
the pseudorandom function is not treated as a black box, and the circuit for the offline phase would
be huge (as it would include multiple copies of a subcircuit for computing pseudorandom function
computations for every wire). Instead, we prove that this type of corrupt behavior can only result in
an abort in the online phase, which would not affect the security of the protocol. This observation
enables us to compute each gate independently and model the pseudorandom function used in the
computation as a black box, thus simplifying the protocol and optimizing its performance.
We also encrypt garbled values as vectors; this enables us to use a finite field that can encode
values from {0, 1}κ (for each vector coordinate), rather than a much larger finite field that can
encode all of {0, 1}L. Due to this, the parties choose keys (for a pseudorandom function) rather
than seeds for a pseudorandom generator. The keys that Pi chooses for wire w are denoted k
i
w,0
and kiw,1, which will be elements in a finite field Fp such that 2κ < p < 2κ+1. In fact, we pick p
to be the smallest prime number larger than 2κ, and set p = 2κ + α, where (by the prime number
theorem) we expect α ≈ κ. We shall denote the pseudorandom function by Fk(x), where the key
and output will be interpreted as elements of Fp in much of our MPC protocol. In practice the
function Fk(x) we suggest will be implemented using CBC-MAC using a block cipher enc with
key and block size κ bits, as Fk(x) = CBC-MACenc(k (mod 2
κ), x). Note that the inputs x to our
pseudorandom function will all be of the same length and so using naive CBC-MAC will be secure.
We interpret the κ-bit output of Fk(x) as an element in Fp where p = 2κ + α. Note that
a mapping which sends an element k ∈ Fp to a κ-bit key by computing k (mod 2κ) induces a























The output of the function Fk(x) will also induce a distribution which is close to uniform on Fp.
4The external values (as denoted in [2]) are the signals (as denoted in [1]) observable by the parties when evaluating the
circuit in the online phase.
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In particular the statistical distance of the output in Fp, for a block cipher with block size κ, from






















(note that 1− 2κp =
α
p ). The statistical difference is therefore negligible. In practice we set κ = 128,
and use the AES cipher as the block cipher enc.
Functionality 2 (The SFE Functionality: FSFE).
The functionality is parameterized by a function f(x1, . . . , xn) which is input as a binary circuit Cf .
The protocol consists of 3 externally exposed commands Initialize, InputData, and Output and one
internal subroutine Wait.
Initialize: On input (init , Cf ) from all parties, the functionality activates and stores Cf .
Wait: This waits on the adversary to return a GO/NO-GO decision. If the adversary returns NO-GO
then the functionality aborts.
InputData: On input (input , Pi, xi) from Pi and (input , Pi, ?) from all other parties, the functionality
stores (Pi, xi). Upon having (Pi, xi) for all i ∈ [n] the functionality calls Wait.
Output: On input (output) from all honest parties the functionality computes y = f(x1, . . . , xn) and
outputs y to the adversary. The functionality then calls Wait. Only if Wait does not abort it
outputs y to all parties.
The goal of this paper is to present a protocol ΠSFE that realizes Functionality 2 in a constant
number of rounds in the setting of a malicious adversary who may corrupt up to n − 1 parties.
Our constant round protocol ΠSFE implementing FSFE is built in the FMPC-hybrid model, i.e.
utilizing a sub-protocol ΠMPC which implements the functionality FMPC given in Functionality 3.
The relation diagram between functionalities and protocols presented in this paper is presented in
Figure 1. The generic MPC functionality FMPC is reactive. We require a reactive MPC functionality
because our protocol ΠSFE will make repeated sequences of calls to FMPC involving both output
and computation commands. In terms of round complexity, all that we require of the sub-protocol
ΠMPC is that each of the commands which it implements can be implemented in constant rounds.
Given this requirement our larger protocol ΠSFE will be constant round.
Figure 1: Outline of our construction: Dashed lines means that Π securely realizes F ; solid lines
means that Π is constructed in the F-hybrid model.
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In what follows we assume that the FMPC functionality maintains a data structure in which
it stores its internal values, so that the parties may request to perform operations (i.e. Input,
Output, Add, Multiply) over the entries of the data structure. We use the notation [val ] to
represent the key used by the functionality to store value val . In addition, we use the arithmetic
shorthands [z] = [x] + [y] and [z] = [x] · [y] to represent the result of calling the Add and Multiply
commands over the inputs x, y and output z. That is, after calling [z] = [x]+[y] (resp. [z] = [x] · [y])
the key [z] is associated with the value x+ y (resp. x · y).
In the Output command of FMPC (Functionality 3), i = 0 means that the value indexed by
varid is output to all parties and i 6= 0 means that it is output to party Pi only. In both cases the
adversary has the power to decide if an honest party receives the output value or not (where in
the latter case, it aborts). Furthermore, when i = 0, the adversary has the ability to inspect that
value before deciding whether to abort.5
Functionality 3 (The Generic Reactive MPC Functionality: FMPC).
The functionality consists of five externally exposed commands Initialize, InputData, Add, Multiply,
and Output, and one internal subroutine Wait.
Initialize: On input (init , p) from all parties, the functionality activates and stores p (otherwise, i.e. if
the parties do not agree on p, the functionality halts). All additions and multiplications below will
be mod p.
Wait: This waits on the adversary to return a GO/NO-GO decision. If the adversary returns NO-GO
then the functionality aborts.
InputData: On input (input , Pi, varid , x) from Pi and (input , Pi, varid , ?) from all other parties, with
varid a fresh identifier, the functionality stores (varid , x). The functionality then calls Wait.
Add: On command (add , varid1, varid2, varid3) from all parties (if varid1, varid2 are present in memory
and varid3 is not), the functionality retrieves (varid1, x), (varid2, y) and stores (varid3, x+ y mod
p). The functionality then calls Wait.
Multiply: On input (multiply , varid1, varid2, varid3) from all parties (if varid1, varid2 are present in
memory and varid3 is not), the functionality retrieves (varid1, x), (varid2, y) and stores (varid3, x ·
y mod p). The functionality then calls Wait.
Output: On input (output , varid , i) from all honest parties (if varid is present in memory), the function-
ality retrieves (varid , x) and outputs either (varid , x) in the case of i 6= 0 or (varid) if i = 0 to the
adversary. The functionality then calls Wait, and only if Wait does not abort then it outputs x
to all parties if i = 0, or it outputs x only to party i if i 6= 0.
3.2 The Offline Functionality: preprocessing-I and preprocessing-II
Our protocol, ΠSFE, is comprised of an offline-phase and an online-phase, where the offline-phase,
which implements the functionality Foffline, is divided into two subphases: preprocessing-I and
preprocessing-II. To aid exposition we first present the functionality Foffline in Functionality 4. In
5Recall that we write our protocol assuming a broadcast channel. Thus, even though we write that in the output
stage all parties receive output if i = 0, when instantiating the broadcast channel with the simple echo-broadcast
described in Section 2, some of the honest parties may receive the output and some may abort.
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Section 4 we present an efficient methodology to implement Foffline which uses the SPDZ protocol as
the underlying MPC protocol for securely computing functionality FMPC; while in Appendix A we
present a generic implementation of Foffline based on any underlying protocol ΠMPC implementing
FMPC.
In describing functionality Foffline we distinguish between attached wires and common wires:
the attached wires are the circuit input-wires that are directly connected to the parties (i.e., these
are inputs wires to the circuit). Thus, if every party has ` inputs to the functionality f then there
are n · ` attached wires. The rest of the wires are considered as common wires, i.e. they are directly
connected to none of the parties.
Our preprocessing-I phase takes as input an upper bound W on the number of wires in the
circuit, and an upper bound G on the number of gates in the circuit. The upper bound G is not
strictly needed, but will be needed in any efficient instantiation based on the SPDZ protocol. In
contrast, the preprocessing-II phase requires knowledge of the precise function f being computed,
which we assume is encoded as a binary circuit Cf .
In order to optimize the performance of preprocessing-II phase, the secure computation does not
evaluate the pseudorandom function F (), but rather has the parties compute F () and provide the
results as an input to the protocol. Observe that corrupted parties may provide incorrect input
values Fkix,j
() and thus the resulting garbled circuit may not actually be a valid BMR garbled
circuit. Nevertheless, we show that such behavior can only result in an abort. This is due to the
fact that if a value is incorrect and honest parties see that their key (coordinate) is not present in
the resulting vector then they will abort. In contrast, if their seed is present then they proceed and
the incorrect value had no effect. Since the keys are secret, the adversary cannot give an incorrect
value that will result in a correct different key, except with negligible probability. Likewise, a
corrupted party cannot influence the masking values λ, and thus they are consistent throughout
(when a given wire is input into multiple gates), ensuring correctness.
3.3 Securely Computing FSFE in the Foffline-Hybrid Model
In Protocol 2 we present our protocol ΠSFE for securely computing FSFE in the Foffline-hybrid model.
In this paper we prove the following:
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem). If F is a pseudorandom function, then Protocol ΠSFE securely com-
putes FSFE in the Foffline-hybrid model, in the presence of a static malicious adversary corrupting
any number of parties.
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Functionality 4 (The Offline Functionality – Foffline).
This functionality runs the same Initialize, Wait, InputData and Output commands as FMPC
(Functionality 3). In addition, the functionality has two additional commands preprocessing-I and
preprocessing-II, as follows.
preprocessing-I: On input (preprocessing-I,W,G), for every wire w ∈ [1, . . . ,W ]:
• Choose and store a random masking value [λw] where λw ∈ {0, 1}.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n and β ∈ {0, 1},
– Store a key of user i for wire w and value β, [kiw,β ] where k
i
w,β is chosen uniformly from Fp.
– Output kiw,β to party i by running Output as in functionality FMPC.
preprocessing-II: On input (preprocessing-II, Cf ) for a Boolean circuit Cf with up to W wires and G gates.
• For all wires w that are attached to party Pi open λw to party Pi by running Output as in
functionality FMPC.
• For all output wires w open λw to all parties by running Output as in functionality FMPC.
• For every gate g with input wires a, b and output wire c (with 0 ≤ a, b, c < W ):
– Party Pi provides the following values for x ∈ {a, b} by running InputData as in functionality
FMPC:
Fkix,0
(0‖1‖g), . . . , Fkix,0(0‖n‖g) Fkix,0(1‖1‖g), . . . , Fkix,0(1‖n‖g)
Fkix,1
(0‖1‖g), . . . , Fkix,1(0‖n‖g) Fkix,1(1‖1‖g), . . . , Fkix,1(1‖n‖g)
(Note that the functionality just receives these values from the parties, and does not check
that these are generated from F in any specific way. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity,
we chose not to introduce more variables here and we use the notation F () as the parties’
inputs.)
– Define the selector variables
χ1 =
{












0 if fg(λa, λb) = λc
1 otherwise
– Set Ag = (A
1
g, . . . , A
n
g ), Bg = (B
1
g , . . . , B
n
g ), Cg = (C
1
g , . . . , C
n
g ), and Dg = (D
1
g , . . . , D
n
g )









































– Store values [Ag], [Bg], [Cg], [Dg].
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Protocol 2 (ΠSFE: Securely Computing FSFE in the Foffline-Hybrid Model).
On input of a circuit Cf representing the function f which consists of at most W wires and at most G
gates the parties execute the following commands.
Pre-Processing: This procedure is performed as follows
1. Call Initialize on Foffline with the smallest prime p in {2κ, . . . , 2κ+1}.
2. Call Preprocessing-I on Foffline with input W and G.
3. Call Preprocessing-II on Foffline with input Cf .
Online Computation: This procedure is performed as follows
1. For all input wires w for party Pi the party takes his input bit ρw and computes Λw = ρw ⊕ λw,
where λw was obtained in the preprocessing stage. The value Λw is broadcast to all parties.
2. Party i calls Output on Foffline to open [kiw,Λw ] for all his input wires w, we denote the resulting
value by kiw.
3. The parties call Output on Foffline to open [Ag], [Bg], [Cg] and [Dg] for every gate g.
4. Passing through the circuit topologically, the parties can now locally compute the following oper-
ations for each gate g
• Let the gate’s input wires be labeled a and b, and the output wire be labeled c.
• For j = 1, . . . , n compute kjc according to the following cases:








































• If kic /∈ {kic,0, kic,1}, then Pi outputs abort. Otherwise, it proceeds. If Pi aborts it notifies all
other parties with that information. If Pi is notified that another party has aborted it aborts
as well.
• If kic = kic,0 then Pi sets Λc = 0; if kic = kic,1 then Pi sets Λc = 1.
• The output of the gate is defined to be (k1c , . . . , knc ) and Λc.
5. Assuming party Pi does not abort it will obtain Λw for every circuit-output wire w. The party
can then recover the actual output value from ρw = Λw ⊕ λw, where λw was obtained in the
preprocessing stage.
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3.4 Implementing Foffline in the FMPC-Hybrid Model
At first sight, it may seem that in order to construct an entire garbled circuit (i.e. the output of
Foffline), an ideal functionality that computes each garbled gate can be used separately for each gate
of the circuit (that is, for each gate the parties provide their PRF results on the keys and shares
of the masking values associated with that gate’s wires). This is sufficient when considering semi-
honest adversaries. However, in the setting of malicious adversaries, this can be problematic since
parties might input inconsistent values. For example, the masking value λw that is common to a
number of gates (which happens when some wire enters more than one gate) needs to be identical in
all of these gates. In addition, the pseudorandom function values might not be correctly computed
from the pseudorandom function keys that are input. In order to make the computation of the
garbled circuit efficient, we will not check that the pseudorandom function values are correct.
However, it is necessary to ensure that the λw values are correct, and that they (and likewise the
keys) are consistent between gates (e.g., as in the case where the same wire is input to multiple
gates). We achieve this by computing the entire circuit at once, via a single functionality.
The cost of this computation is actually almost the same as separately computing each gate.




w,1 and the output of the pseudorandom
function applied to the keys only once, regardless of the number of gates to which w is input.
Thereby consistency is immediate throughout, and the potential attack against consistency is pre-
vented. Moreover, the λw values are generated once and used consistently by the circuit, making
it easy to ensure that the λ values are correct.
Another issue that arises is that the single garbled gate functionality expects to receive a single
masking value for each wire. However, since this value is secret, it must be generated from shares
that are input by the parties. This introduces a challenge since the functionality FMPC works (i.e.,
its commands are) over a finite field Fp while the masking bit must be a single binary bit. Thus, it
is not possible to simply have each party choose its own share bit and then XOR these bits inside
FMPC. The only option offered by FMPC is to have the parties each input a field element, and then
use these inputs to produce a uniform bit that will be used to mask the wire’s signal. This must be
done in a way that results in a uniform value in {0, 1}, even in the presence of malicious parties may
input field elements that are not according to the prescribed distribution, and potentially harm the
security. This must therefore be prevented by our protocol.
In Appendix A, we describe a general method for securely computing Foffline in the FMPC-hybrid
model, using any protocol that securely computes the FMPC ideal functionality. The aforementioned
problem issue is solved in the following way. The computation is performed by having the parties
input random masking values λiw ∈ {1,−1}, instead of bits. This enables the computation of a
value µw to be the product of λ
1
w, . . . , λ
n
w and to be random in {−1, 1} as long as one of them is
random. The product is then mapped to {0, 1} in Fp by computing λw = µw+12 .
In order to prevent corrupted parties from inputting λiw values that are not in {−1,+1}, the





2− 1, for every wire w (where λiw is the share
contributed from party i for wire w), and the parties can simply check whether it is equal to zero




w /∈ {−1,+1}, then this will be





2 − 1, and so the parties detect





w ∈ {−1,+1}, then the additional value output reveals nothing about λw
itself.
In the next section we show that all of these complications can be removed by basing our imple-
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mentation for FMPC upon the specific SPDZ protocol. The reason why the SPDZ implementation
is simpler – and more efficient – is that SPDZ provides generation of such shared values effectively
for free.
4 The SPDZ Based Instantiation
4.1 Utilizing the SPDZ Protocol
As discussed in Section 3.1, in the offline-phase we use an underlying secure computation protocol,
which, given a binary circuit and the matching inputs to its input wires, securely and distributively
computes that binary circuit. In this section we simplify and optimize the implementation of the
protocol Πoffline which implements the functionality Foffline by utilizing the specific SPDZ protocol
as the underlying implementation of FMPC. These optimizations are possible because the SPDZ
protocol provides a richer interface to the protocol designer than the naive generic MPC interface
given in the functionality FMPC. In particular, it provides the capability of directly generating
shared random bits and strings. These are used for generating the masking values and pseudoran-
dom function keys. Note that one of the most expensive steps in FairplayMP [2] was coin tossing to
generate the masking values; by utilizing the specific properties of SPDZ this is achieved essentially
for free.
In Section 4.2 we describe explicit operations that are to be carried out on the inputs in order to
achieve the desired output; the circuit’s complexity analysis appears in Section 4.3 and the expected
results from an implementation of the circuit using the SPDZ protocol are in Section 4.6.
Throughout, we utilize FSPDZ (Functionality 5), which represents an idealized representation of
the SPDZ protocol, akin to the functionality FMPC from Section 3.1. Note that in the real protocol,
FSPDZ is implemented itself by an offline phase (essentially corresponding to our preprocessing-I)
and an online phase (corresponding to our preprocessing-II). We fold the SPDZ offline phase into the
Initialize command of FSPDZ. In the SPDZ offline phase we need to know the maximum number
of multiplications, random values and random bits required in the online phase. In that phase
the random shared bits and values are produced, as well as the multiplication (Beaver) Triples6
for use in the multiplication gates performed in the SPDZ online phase [11]. In particular the
consuming of shared random bits and values results in no cost during the SPDZ online phase, with
all consumption costs being performed in the SPDZ offline phase. The protocol, which utilizes
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) to produce the shared random values/bits and the
Beaver multiplication triples, is given in [11].
6Multiplication (Beaver) triples are a standard part of the implementation of the SPDZ protocol; we assume
familiarity with this method in this paper.
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Functionality 5 (The SPDZ Functionality: FSPDZ).
The functionality consists of seven externally exposed commands Initialize, InputData, RandomBit,
Random, Add, Multiply, and Output and one internal subroutine Wait.
Initialize: On input (init , p,M,B,R, I) from all parties, the functionality activates and stores p. The
functionality will accept a maximum of M Multiply, B RandomBit, R Random commands
overall in addition to I InputData commands per party. If the number of command requests
exceeds the above then the functionality aborts.
Wait: This waits on the adversary to return a GO/NO-GO decision. If the adversary returns NO-GO
then the functionality aborts.
InputData: On input (input , Pi, varid , x) from Pi and (input , Pi, varid , ?) from all other parties, with
varid a fresh identifier, the functionality stores (varid , x). The functionality then calls Wait.
RandomBit: On command (randombit , varid) from all parties, with varid a fresh identifier, the func-
tionality selects a random value r ∈ {0, 1} and stores (varid , r). The functionality then calls
Wait.
Random: On command (random, varid) from all parties, with varid a fresh identifier, the functionality
selects a random value r ∈ Fp and stores (varid , r). The functionality then calls Wait.
Add: On command (add , varid1, varid2, varid3) from all parties (if varid1, varid2 are present in memory),
the functionality retrieves (varid1, x), (varid2, y), stores (varid3, x+ y) and then calls Wait.
Multiply: On input (multiply , varid1, varid2, varid3) from all parties (if varid1, varid2 are present in
memory), the functionality retrieves (varid1, x), (varid2, y), stores (varid3, x · y) and then calls
Wait.
Output: On input (output , varid , i) from all honest parties (if varid is present in memory), the function-
ality retrieves (varid , x) and outputs either (varid , x) in the case of i 6= 0 or (varid) if i = 0 to the
adversary. The functionality then calls Wait, and only if Wait does not abort then it outputs x
to all parties if i = 0, or it outputs x only to party i if i 6= 0.
4.2 The Πoffline SPDZ-Based Protocol
As remarked earlier Foffline can be securely computed using any secure multi-party protocol. This
is advantageous since it means that future efficiency improvements to concretely secure multi-party
computation (with dishonest majority) will automatically make our protocol faster. However,
currently the best option is SPDZ. Specifically, this option utilizes the fact that SPDZ can very
efficiently generate coin tosses. This means that it is not necessary for the parties to input the λiw
values, multiply them together to obtain λw and to output the check values (λw)
2 − 1. Thus, this
yields a significant efficiency improvement. We now describe the protocol which implements Foffline
in the FSPDZ-hybrid model.
preprocessing-I.
1. Initialize the MPC Engine7: Call Initialize on the functionality FSPDZ with input p, a
prime with p > 2k and with parameters
M = GX(2n+ 3) +GA(4n+ 5), B = W, R = 2 ·W · n, I = 8 ·G · n
where GX , GA are the number of XOR and AND gates in Cf respectively, n is the number of
parties andW is the number of input wires per party. In practice the termW in the calculation
of I needs only be an upper bound on the total number of input wires per party in the circuit
7By “MPC Engine” we refer to the underlying secure computation, the SPDZ functionality in this case.
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which will eventually be evaluated. The value of M is derived from the complexity analysis
below and I = 8 · G · n since every gate has 2 input wires, each input wire has 2 keys per
party, who inputs 2 pseudorandom function outputs values per party.
2. Generate wire masks: For every circuit wire w we need to generate a sharing of the (secret)
masking-values λw. Thus for all wires w the parties execute the command RandomBit on
the functionality FSPDZ, the output is denoted by [λw]. The functionality FSPDZ guarantees
that λw ∈ {0, 1}.
3. Generate keys: For every wire w, each party i ∈ [1, . . . , n] and for j ∈ {0, 1}, the parties call
Random on the functionality FSPDZ to obtain output [kiw,j ]. The parties then call Output




i=1 shall be denoted by
[kw,j ].
preprocessing-II. (This protocol implements the computation of gate tables as it is detailed in
the BMR protocol. The correctness of this construction is explained at the end of Appendix 2.)
1. Output input wire values: For all wires w which are attached to party Pi (i.e., correspond
to input bits of Pi) we execute the command Output on the functionality FSPDZ to open
[λw] to party i.
2. Output masks for circuit-output-wires: In order to reveal the real values of the circuit
output-wires it is required to reveal their masking values. That is, for every circuit output-
wire w, the parties execute the command Output on the functionality FSPDZ for the stored
value [λw].
3. Calculate garbled gates: This step is operated for each gate g in the circuit in parallel.
Specifically, let g be a gate whose input wires are a, b and output wire is c. Do as follows:
(a) Calculate output indicators: This step calculates four indicators [xa], [xb], [xc], [xd]
whose values will be in {0, 1}. Each one of the garbled labels Ag,Bg,Cg,Dg is a vector
of n elements that hide either the vector kc,0 = k
1
c,0, . . . , k
n
c,0 or kc,1 = k
1
c,1, . . . , k
n
c,1;
which vector is hidden depends on these indicators, i.e if xa = 0 then Ag hides kc,0 and
if xa = 1 then Ag hides kc,1. Similarly, Bg depends on xb, Cg depends on xc and Dc
depends on xd. Each indicator is determined by some function on [λa], [λb],[λc] and the
truth table of the gate fg. Every indicator is calculated slightly differently, as follows




























= (fg((1− [λa]), (1− [λb]))− [λc])2
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where the binary operator
?
6= is defined as [a]
?
6= [b] equals [0] if a = b, and equals [1] if
a 6= b. For the XOR function on a and b, for example, the operator can be evaluated by
computing [a] + [b] − 2 · [a] · [b]. Thus, these calculations can be computed using Add
and Multiply.
(b) Assign the correct vector: As described above, we use the calculated indicators to
choose for every garbled label either kc,0 or kc,1. Calculate:
[vc,xa ] = [kc,0] + [xa] · ([kc,1]− [kc,0])
[vc,xb ] = [kc,0] + [xb] · ([kc,1]− [kc,0])
[vc,xc ] = [kc,0] + [xc] · ([kc,1]− [kc,0])
[vc,xd ] = [kc,0] + [xd] · ([kc,1]− [kc,0])
In each equation either the value kc,0 or the value kc,1 is taken, depending on the
corresponding indicator value. Once again, these calculations can be computed using
Add and Multiply.
(c) Calculate garbled labels: Party i knows the value of kiw,b (for wire w that enters gate
g) for b ∈ {0, 1}, and so can compute the 2 · n values Fkiw,b(0 ‖ 1 ‖ g), . . . , Fkiw,b(0 ‖n ‖ g)
and Fkiw,b
(1‖1‖g), . . . , Fkiw,b(1‖n‖g). Party i inputs these values by calling InputData
on the functionality FSPDZ. The resulting input pseudorandom vectors are denoted by
[F 0kiw,b
(g)] = [Fkiw,b
(0‖1‖g), . . . , Fkiw,b(0‖n‖g)]
[F 1kiw,b
(g)] = [Fkiw,b
(1‖1‖g), . . . , Fkiw,b(1‖n‖g)].





































where every + operation is performed on vectors of n elements.
4. Notify parties: Output construction-done.
The functions fg in Step 3a above depend on the specific gate being evaluated. For example, on
clear values we have,
• If fg = ∧ (i.e. the AND function), λa = 1, λb = 1 and λc = 0 then xa = ((1 ∧ 1) − 0)2 =
(1 − 0)2 = 1. Similarly xb = ((1 ∧ (1 − 1)) − 0)2 = (0 − 0)2 = 0, xc = 0 and xd = 0. The
parties can compute fg on shared values [x] and [y] by computing fg([x], [y]) = [x] · [y].
• If fg = ⊕ (i.e. the XOR function), then xa = ((1 ⊕ 1) − 0)2 = (0 − 0)2 = 0, xb = ((1 ⊕ (1 −
1))− 0)2 = (1− 0)2 = 1, xc = 1 and xd = 0. The parties can compute fg on shared values [x]
and [y] by computing fg([x], [y]) = [x] + [y]− 2 · [x] · [y].
Below, we will show how [xa], [xb], [xc] and [xd] can be computed more efficiently.
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4.3 Circuit Complexity
In this section we analyze the complexity of the circuit that constructs the garbled version of Cf in
terms of the number of multiplication gates and the depth of the circuit.8 We are mainly concerned
with multiplication gates since, given the SPDZ shares [a] and [b] of the secrets a, and b resp., an
interaction between the parties is required to achieve a secret sharing of the secret a · b. Achieving
a secret sharing of a linear combination of a and b (i.e. α · a+ β · b where α and β are constants),
however, can be done locally and is thus considered to have a negligible overhead. We are interested
in the depth of the circuit because it gives a lower bound on the number of rounds of interaction
that are required for computing the circuit (note that here, as before, we are concerned with the
depth in terms of multiplication gates).
Multiplication gates. We first analyze the number of multiplication operations that are carried
out per gate (i.e. in Step 3) and later analyze the entire circuit.
• Multiplications per gate. We will follow the calculation that is done per gate in the same
order as it appears in Step 3 of preprocessing-II phase:
1. In order to calculate the indicators in Step 3a it suffices to compute one multiplication
and 4 squarings. We can do this by altering the equations a little. For example, for
fg = AND, we calculate the indicators by first computing [t] = [λa] · [λb] (this is the
only multiplication) and then [xa] = ([t] − [λc])2, [xb] = ([λa] − [t] − [λc])2, [xc] =
([λb]− [t]− [λc])2, and [xd] = (1− [λa]− [λb] + [t]− [λc])2.
[xa] = ([t]− [λc])2
[xb] = ([λa]− [t]− [λc])2
[xc] = ([λb]− [t]− [λc])2
[xd] = (1− [λa]− [λb] + [t]− [λc])2
As another example, for fg = XOR, we first compute [t] = [λa]⊕ [λb] = [λa] + [λb]− 2 ·
[λa] · [λb] (this is the only multiplication), and then [xa] = ([t]− [λc])2, [xb] = (1− [λa]−
[λb] + 2 · [t]− [λc])2, [xc] = [xb], and [xd] = [xa].
[xa] = ([t]− [λc])2
[xb] = (1− [λa]− [λb] + 2 · [t]− [λc])2
[xc] = [xb]
[xd] = [xa]
Observe that in XOR gates only two squaring operations are needed.
2. To obtain the correct vector (in Step 3b) which is used in each garbled label, we carry
out 4n multiplications (since we multiply the bit [xa] with each component of the vector
([kc,1]− [kc,0]). The same holds for bits [xb], [xc] and [xd]). Note that in XOR gates only
2n multiplications are needed, because kc,xc = kc,xb and kc,xd = kc,xa .
8This analysis refers to the complexity of the circuit that the parties garble in the offline phase, not the circuit
that the parties wish to compute over their private inputs (i.e. Cf ).
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Summing up (and counting a squaring operation as a multiplication), we have 4n+ 5 multi-
plications per AND gate and 2n+ 3 multiplications per XOR gate.
• Multiplications in the entire circuit. Denote the number of multiplication operations
per gate (i.e. 4n + 5 for AND and 2n + 3 for XOR) by c. We get G · c multiplications for
garbling all gates (where G is the number of gates in Cf ). Besides garbling the gates we have
no other multiplication operations. Thus we require c ·G multiplications in total.
Depth of the circuit and round complexity. Each gate can be garbled by a circuit of depth
3 (two levels are required for Step 3a and another one for Step 3b). Recall that additions are local
operations only and thus we measure depth in terms of multiplication gates only. Since all gates
can be garbled in parallel this implies an overall depth of three. Since the number of rounds of
the SPDZ protocol is in the order of the depth of the circuit, it follows that Foffline can be securely
computed in a constant number of rounds.
Other Considerations. The overall cost of the pre-processing does not just depend on the
number of multiplications. Rather, the parties also need to produce the random data via calls to
Random and RandomBit to the functionality FSPDZ.9 It is clear all of these can be executed in
parallel. If W is the number of wires in the circuit then the total number of calls to RandomBit
is equal to W , whereas the total number of calls to Random is 2 · n ·W .
4.4 Communication and Computation Complexity
Denote by WI and WO the number of input and output wires in Cf . We first analyze the commu-
nication complexity of our online phase and then the offline. We count the number of underlying
operations in FMPC and then plug in the complexity of these operations when using SPDZ [12]. In
addition, we count the number of bit/element broadcasts, which will be replaced later with O(n2)
using the simple broadcast with abort protocol discussed above.
Online phase. The parties first broadcast the external bit for w, which is used to open the
appropriate key for w for every w ∈WI . Then the parties open the garbled version of Cf (i.e. the
4-entries Ag,Bg,Cg,Dg) by calling Output 4Gn times, where G is the number of gates in the
circuit. Overall, WI bits are broadcast and WI + 4Gn field elements are opened. The Output
command in SPDZ has communication and computation complexity of O(n3); plugging this into
the above, we obtain communication complexity O(WI · n3 +G · n4) and computation complexity
O(G · n4) (note that the bit broadcast operations require essentially no computation).
Offline phase. Our offline phase consists of two sub-phases, preprocessing-I and preprocessing-II
which are SPDZ’s offline and online phases respectively. In the former, the parties generate the
raw materials like multiplication-triples and input-pairs (see [12]), while in the latter they eval-
uate the arithmetic circuit that produces the garbled circuit of Cf . We count the complexity of
preprocessing-II first: We count the number of command invocations and then plug in SPDZ’s com-
plexities. For all w ∈ WI the protocol runs Output for the masking bit of input wire w to the
9These Random calls are followed immediately with an Open to a party. However, in SPDZ Random followed
by Open has roughly the same cost as Random alone.
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party with whom it is associated, and for all w ∈ WO the protocols runs Output of the masking
bit of w to all parties. Then, as mentioned before, the parties input I = 8Gn PRF outputs for the
computation of the garbled circuit using the Input command. Finally, there are O(n) invocations
of Multiply to garble each gate (specifically, 4n+ 5 for an AND gate and 3n+ 2 for a XOR gate).
Performing both Input and Multiply in SPDZ takes O(n) communication and computation, and
thus we get overall O
(
(WI +WO) · n3 +G · n2
)
communication and computation.
As for preprocessing-I, we take the complexity analysis from [19]. Generating an input-pair
requires the communication of (n − 1) · (κ2 + κ) bit, resulting in O(n2 · κ2 · G) for all inputs.
Generating a multiplication-triple costs O(n2 · κ2) and we need O(n) multiplication-triples per
gate, resulting in O(G · n3 · κ2) bits of communication.
4.5 Round Complexity
As analyzed above, the circuit that constructs the garbled version of Cf has multiplication depth
of three. It therefore remains to plug in the round complexity of the SPDZ offline phase and
its implementation of the commands in FMPC. This yields an overall complexity of 12 rounds of
communication: 6 rounds for preprocessing-I (SPDZ offline), 3 rounds for preprocessing-II (SPDZ
online), and 3 rounds for the online phase to evaluate the garbled circuit.
4.6 Expected Runtimes
To estimate the run time of our protocol, we extrapolate from known public data [12, 11] (this
involves some speculation, but is based on real values for actual cost of the SPDZ operations,
which dominates the computation and communication). The offline phase of the protocol runs
both the offline and online phases of the SPDZ protocol. The numbers that are listed in Table 1
refer (in milli-seconds) to the SPDZ offline phase, as described in [11], with covert security and a 20%
probability of cheating, using finite fields of size 128-bits. As described in [11], comparable times
are obtainable for running in the fully malicious mode (but more memory is needed). The offline
phase of SPDZ is comprised of the generation of several types of raw material: The multiplication
(Beaver) triples are used by the parties to perform a secure multiplication over two variables stored
by the functionality, the number of required multiplication triples is equivalent to the number of
multiplication gates in the arithmetic circuit that we use to construct the garbled circuit Cf . The
number of random bits (resp. random field elements) is the number of bits (resp. field elements)
that will be used in the arithmetic circuit. Finally, we also consider the number of required inputs
since the SPDZ’s offline phase produces some raw data for every input wire in the circuit, this
raw data is essentially an authenticated share of a random element [r] which is opened only to the
party to which that input wire is associated such that in the online phase that party broadcasts
d = x− r where x is its input to that wire, then the parties perform a constant addition to obtain
an authenticated share of x. See [12] for more details.
No. Parties Beaver Triple RandomBit Random Input
2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
4 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.9
Table 1: SPDZ offline generation times in milliseconds per operation
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Denote by btr(n), rnb(n), rnd(n), inp(n) the times to generate one beaver triple, one random
bit, one random element, and entering one input element respectively (which are depend on the
number of parties n). Let GX and GA be the number of XOR and AND gates in Cf respectively.
The preprocessing-I (SPDZ’s offline phase) time is computed by
Tpreprocessing-I =
(
GX(2n+ 3) +GA(4n+ 5)
)
· btr(n) +B · rnb(n) +R(n) · rnd(n) + I(n) · inp(n)
=
(
GX(2n+ 3) +GA(4n+ 5)
)
· btr(n) +B · rnb(n) + 2Wn · rnd(n) + 8Gn · inp(n)
(note that R and I also depend on n).
The implementation of the SPDZ online phase, described in both [11] and [20], reports online
throughputs of between 200,000 and 600,000 multiplications per second, depending on the system
configuration. As remarked earlier the online time of other operations is negligible and is therefore
ignored. Thus, the preprocessing-II time is computed by
Tpreprocessing-II =
(
GX(2n+ 3) +GA(4n+ 5)
)
mps
where mps is the number of multiplications per second that the SPDZ system is able to perform.
To see what this would imply in practice, consider the AES circuit described in [29]; which
has become the standard benchmarking case for secure computation calculations. The basic AES
circuit has G ≈ 33, 000 (with GA ≈ 6000 and GX ≈ 27000) gates and a similar number of wires W ,
including the key expansion within the circuit.10 Assuming the parties share a XOR sharing of the
AES key and data, (which adds an additional 2 · (n − 1) · 128 gates and wires to the circuit), the
parameters for the Initialize call to the FSPDZ functionality in the preprocessing-I protocol will be
M ≈ (GX + 256(n− 1))(2n+ 3) +GA(4n+ 5)
B ≈ G+ 256n
R ≈ 2Wn+ 256n
I ≈ 8 · (G+ 256(n− 1)) · n
Recall that M is the number of multiplications, B the number of random bits, R the number of
random field elements and I the number of input wires. Using the above execution times for the
SPDZ protocol we can then estimate the time needed for the two parts of our preprocessing step
for the AES circuit. The expected execution times, in seconds, are given in Table 2.
These expected times, due to the methodology of our protocol, are likely to estimate both the
latency and throughput amortized over many executions (we only have these times for 2, 3 and 4
parties, since these are the times that have been published for SPDZ offline computations).
No. Parties M B R I preprocessing-I preprocessing-II
2 268792 33512 132512 532096 320 0.44–1.34
3 349608 33768 198768 804288 628 0.58–1.74
4 431448 34024 265024 1080576 1640 0.71–2.15
Table 2: Preprocessing times (in seconds) for the AES circuit.
10Note that unlike [29] and other Yao based techniques we cannot process XOR gates for free. On the other hand
we are not restricted to only two parties.
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The execution of the online phase of our protocol, when the parties are given their inputs and
actually want to compute the function, is very efficient: all that is needed is the evaluation of a
garbled circuit based on the data obtained in the offline stage. Specifically, for each gate each party
needs to process two input wires, and for each wire it needs to expand n seeds to a length which
is n times their original length (where n denotes the number of parties). Namely, for each gate
each party needs to compute a pseudorandom function 2n2 times (more specifically, it needs to run
2n key schedulings, and use each key for n encryptions). We examined the cost of implementing
these operations for an AES circuit of 33,000 gates when the pseudorandom function is computed
using the AES-NI instruction set. The run times for n = 2, 3, 4 parties were 6.35msec, 9.88msec
and 15msec, respectively, for C code compiled using the gcc compiler on a 2.9GHZ Xeon machine.
The actual run time, including all non-cryptographic operations, should be higher, but of the same
order.
Our run-times estimates compare favourably to several other results on implementing secure
computation of AES in a multiparty setting:
• In [10] an actively secure computation of AES using SPDZ took an offline time of over five
minutes per AES block, with an online time of around a quarter of a second; that computation
used a security parameter of 64 as opposed to our estimates using a security parameter of 128.
• In [20] another experiment was shown which can achieve a latency of 50 milliseconds in the
online phase for AES (but no offline times are given).
• In [26] the authors report on a two-party MPC evaluation of the AES circuit using the Tiny-
OT protocol; they obtain for 80 bits of security an amortized offline time of nearly three
seconds per AES block, and an amortized online time of 30 milliseconds; but the reported
non-amortized latency is much worse. Furthermore, this implementation is limited to the
case of two parties, whereas we obtain security for multiple parties.
Most importantly, all of the above experiments were carried out in a LAN setting where commu-
nication latency is very small. However, in other settings where parties are not connected by very
fast connections, the effect of the number of rounds on the protocol will be extremely significant.
For example, in [10], an arithmetic circuit for AES is constructed of depth 120, and this is then
reduced to depth 50 using a bit decomposition technique. Note that if parties are in separate
geographical locations, then this number of rounds will very quickly dominate the running time.
For example, the latency on Amazon EC2 between Virginia and Ireland is 75ms. For a circuit
depth of 50, and even assuming just a single round per level, the running-time cannot be less than
3750 milliseconds (even if computation takes zero time). In contrast, our online phase has just 2
rounds of communication and so will take in the range of 150 milliseconds. We stress that even
on a much faster network with a latency of just 10ms, protocols with 50 rounds of communication
will still be slow.
5 Security Proof
In this section we prove the main theorem of this paper, i.e. see theorem 1. The security proof
contains two steps. In the first step we reduce the security in the semi-honest case to the security
of the original BMR protocol, that is, we only consider an adversary A that does not deviate from
the prescribed protocol and only tries to learn information from the transcript. In the second step
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we show that our protocol remains secure even if A is malicious, i.e. is allowed to deviate from the
protocol. This second step is performed by showing a reduction from the malicious model to the
semi-honest model. In both steps the adversary A is assumed to corrupt parties in the beginning
of the execution of the protocol.
We first present some conventions and notations. In both the original BMR protocol and our
protocol the players obtain a garbled circuit and a matched set of garbled inputs, they are then
able to evaluate the circuit without further interaction. The players evaluate the circuit from the
bottom up until they reach the circuit-output wires. I.e., the input wires are said to be at the
“bottom” of the circuit, whilst the output wires are at the “top”. In their evaluation the players
use the garbled gate g to reveal a single external value for wire c (i.e., Λc, where c is g’s output
wire) together with an appropriate key-vector kc,Λc = k
1
c,Λc
, . . . , knc,Λc . There is only one entry in
the garbled gate that can be used to reveal the pair (Λc,kc,Λc); specifically if g’s input wires are a
and b then entry (2Λa+Λb) in the table of the garbled gate of g is used (where the entries indices are
0 for Ag, 1 for Bg, 2 for Cg and 3 for Dg). For each gate we denote the garbled entry for which the
players evaluate that gate as the active entry. The other three entries are denoted as the inactive
entries. Similarly we use the term active signal to denote the value Λc that is revealed for some
wire c, and the term active path for the set of active signals that have been revealed to the players
during the evaluation of the circuit. Recall that in the online phase of our protocol the players
exchange the active signal of all the circuit-input wires. We denote by I the set of indices of the
players that are under the control of the adversary A, and by xI their inputs to the functionality
(note that in the malicious case these inputs might be different from the inputs that the players
have been given originally). In the same manner, J is the set of indices of the honest-parties and xJ
denotes their inputs. (Therefore |I ∪ J | = n and I ∩ J = ∅.) We denote by W , Win and Wout the
sets of all wires, the set of circuit-input wires (a.k.a. attached wires) and the set of circuit-output
wires of the circuit C, respectively. We denote the set of gates in the circuit as G = {g1, . . . , g|G|}.
Recall that κ is the security parameter.
5.1 Security in the semi-honest model
The basic goal of the proof is to show that there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time procedure,
P, whose input is a view sampled from the view distribution of a semi-honest adversary involved
in a real execution of the original BMR protocol11, namely REALBMRA in View 1; and its output is
a view from the view distribution of a semi-honest adversary involved in a real execution of our
protocol, namely REALOurA (x̄) in View 2. Formally, the procedure is defined as
P : {REALBMRA }x̄ → {REALOurA (x̄)}x̄
where x̄ = x1, . . . , xn is the players’ input to the functionality.
In this section we present the procedure P and show that {P(REALBMRA )}x̄ and {REALOurA (x̄)}x̄
are indistinguishable. We then show that the existence of a simulator, SBMR, for A’s view in the
execution of the original BMR protocol implies the existence of a simulator SOUR for A’s view in
the execution of our protocol. In the following we first describe REALBMRA (View 1) and REAL
Our
A (x̄)
(View 2), then we describe the procedure P and prove the mentioned claims.
We are ready to describe the procedure P (Procedure 1), which is given a view REALBMRA that is
sampled from the distribution of the adversary’s views under the input x̄ of the players in the original
11In this section we actually refer to the execution in the hybrid model where the parties have access to the underlying MPC
functionality. We denote it as real execution for convenience.
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View 1 (The view REALBMRA ).
For every i ∈ I the adversary sees the following:
1. Masking shares: Shares of the masking values for all wires W , i.e. {λiw ∈ {0, 1} | w ∈W}.
2. Masking values for attached wires: The ` masking values λw of Pi’s attached wires
w are revealed in the clear.
3. Seeds: Player Pi’s seed values {siw,0, siw,1 ∈ {0, 1}κ | w ∈W}.
4. Seed extensions: For each seed siw,b player Pi sees two pseudo-random extensions
G1(siw,b), G
2(siw,b) ∈ {0, 1}nκ.
In addition the adversary sees:
1. Masking values for output wires: The masking values {λw ∈ {0, 1} | w ∈Wout}.
2. Garbled circuit: For every gate g the garbled table {Ag, Bg, Cg, Dg | g ∈ G} where
Ag, Bg, Cg, Dg ∈ {0, 1}nκ.
3. Inputs: The input values x̄I .
4. Active path: For every wire w in the circuit one active signal together with its matched
superseed, i.e. (Λw, Sw,Λw), using one entry of the garbled gate. The rest of the values (i.e.
the inactive entries) are indistinguishable from random.
View 2 (The view REALOurA (x̄)).
For every i ∈ I the adversary sees the following:
1. Masking values for attached wires: The ` masking values λw of Pi’s attached wires
w are revealed in the clear.
2. Keys. Player Pi’s random keys {kiw,0, kiw,1 ∈ Fp | w ∈W}.
3. Keys extensions. For every key kiw,b, and for every gate g which wire w enters into, the
values {
Fkiw,b(0‖1‖g), . . . , Fkiw,b(0‖n‖g),
Fkiw,b(1‖1‖g), . . . , Fkiw,b(1‖n‖g) | w ∈W
}
.
In addition the adversary sees:
1. Masking values for output wires: The masking values {λw ∈ {0, 1} | w ∈Wout}.
2. Construction done. The message construction-done broadcasted by the functionality.
3. Inputs. The input values x̄I .
4. Open message The message open.
5. Garbled circuit. For every gate g {Ag, Bg, Cg, Dg | g ∈ G} where Ag, Bg, Cg, Dg ∈ (Fp)n.
6. Active path. For every wire w in the circuit one active signal together with its matched
key-vector, i.e. (Λw,kw,Λw), using one entry of the garbled gate.
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BMR protocol, and outputs a view from the distribution of the adversary’s views in our protocol
(i.e. REALOurA (x̄)). We will then show that the resulting distribution of views is indistinguishable
from REALOurA (x̄) for every x̄. Since P sees the garbled circuit and the matched set of (garbled)
inputs from all players, it can evaluate the circuit by itself and determine the active path and the
output ȳI , however, P does not knows x̄J (it only knows x̄I) and thus cannot construct a garbled
circuit for our protocol from scratch. It must instead use the information that can be extracted
from it input view.
Procedure 1 (The Procedure P).
Input. A view v taken from distribution REALBMRA under the input x̄.
Output. A view v′ conforming to the message flow in REALOurA (x̄).
The procedure proceeds as follows:
1. Take the masking values for the attached wires and for the output wires Wout to be the
same as in v.
2. Set xI to be the same as in v.
3. To construct the garbled circuit:
(a) Choose a random set of keys {kiw,b | w ∈ W, b ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ I ∪ J} for the players, and
for each key compute the appropriate 2n PRF values.
(b) Choose a random set of masking values for all wires that are not attached with the
players PI and are not in Wout.
(c) For every gate g in the circuit, with input wires a, b and output wire c, the algorithm
sets the the garbled entries (except one as described immediately) to be random values
from (Fp)n whilst for the (2 ·Λa + Λb)-th entry the algorithm instead conceals the Λc
key-vector (in contrast to the real construction in which the key-vector that the entry
conceals depends on the masking values of a, b and c). That is, when the algorithm
constructs the garbled gates it ignores the masking values that it chose in the previous
step. For example, take Λa = 1,Λb = 0 and Λc = 1 then the entry by which the players
evaluate the gate is the 2 · Λa + Λb = 2 (i.e. the third) entry which is Cg. Thus P














for j = 1, . . . , n as described in Functionality 4. Note that we explicitly conceal kjc,1
for every element in kc,1 because we already know from the active path of v that the
external value of wire c is Λc = 1.
4. Add the messages construction-done and open to the obvious location in the resulting view.
Claim 1. Given that the BMR protocol is secure in the semi-honest model, our protocol is secure
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in the semi-honest model as well.
Proof. From the security of the BMR protocol we know that
{SBMR(1κ, I, xI , yI)}x̄
c≡ {REALBMRA }x̄
thus, for every PPT algorithm, and specifically for algorithm P it holds that
{P(SBMR(1κ, I, xI , yI))}x̄
c≡ {P(REALBMRA )}x̄
then, if the following computational indistinguishability holds (proven in claim 2)
{REALOurA (x̄)}x̄
c≡ {P(REALBMRA )}x̄ (1)
then by transitivity of indistinguishability, it follows that
{P(SBMR(1κ, I, xI , yI))}x̄
c≡ {P(REALBMRA )}x̄
c≡ {REALOurA (x̄)}x̄
⇒ {P(SBMR(1κ, I, xI , yI))}x̄
c≡ {REALOurA (x̄)}x̄
hence, P ◦SBMR is a good simulator for the view of the adversary in the semi-honest model. 
In the following we prove Equation 1:
Claim 2. The probability ensemble of the view of the adversary in the real execution of our protocol
and the probability ensemble of the view of the adversary resulting by procedure P, both indexed by
the players’ inputs to the functionality x̄, are computationally indistinguishable. That is:
{REALOurA (x̄)}x̄
c≡ {P(REALBMRA )}x̄
Proof. Remember that in procedure P we do not have any information about the masking values
{λw | w ∈W} (except of those which are known to the adversary), therefore we cannot compute the
indicators xA, xB, xC , xD (as described in section 4.2) and thus could not tell which key vector is
encrypted in each entry. That is, we cannot fill out correctly the four garbled gate entries A,B,C,D.
On the other hand, in procedure P we do know the set of external values {Λw | w ∈ W}, thus,
we know for sure that for every gate g, with input wires a, b and output wire c, the key vector
encrypted in the 2Λa + Λb-th entry of the garbled table of gate g is the Λc -th key vector kc,Λc .
Let us denote by {REALOurA (x̄)}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj the view of the adversary in the execution of our
protocol (which computes the functionality f) with players’ inputs x̄ when using the keys {kiw,β |
1 ≤ i ≤ n,w ∈ W,β ∈ {0, 1}} and the masking values {λj | j ∈ W}. Similarly, denote by
{P(REALBMRA )}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj the view of the adversary in the output of procedure P.
Given that
{REALOurA (x̄)}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj
c≡ {P(REALBMRA )}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj (2)
are computationally indistinguishable (i.e. under the same functionality, players’ inputs, keys and
masking values) it follows that
{REALOurA (x̄)}x̄
c≡ {P(REALBMRA )}x̄
since the functionality, keys and masking values are taken from exactly the same distribution in
both cases.
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In Claim 3 we prove that Equation 2 holds.
Claim 3. Fix a functionality f , the players’ inputs x̄, keys {kiw,β | 1 ≤ i ≤ n,w ∈ W,β ∈ {0, 1}}
and masking values {λj | j ∈ W} used in both the execution of our protocol and procedure P, then
equation (2) holds; that is
{REALOurA (x̄)}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj
c≡ {P(REALBMRA )}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj
Proof. Remember that the difference between {REALOurA (x̄)}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj and {P(REAL
BMR
A )}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj
is in the values of the entries of the garbled gates which are not in the active path, that is, in
{REALOurA (x̄)}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj these values are computed as described in section 4.2 while in {P(REAL
BMR
A )}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj
they are just random values from (Fp)n.
Let D be a polynomial time distinguisher such that
|Pr[D({REALOurA (x̄)}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj ) = 1]− Pr[D({P(REAL
BMR
A )}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj ) = 1]| = ε(κ)
and assume by contradiction that ε is some non-negligible function in κ.
Let C be the boolean circuit that computes the functionality f . For the purpose of the proof
we index the gates of C (the set of gates is denoted by G) in the following manner: C may be
considered as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), where the gates are the nodes in the graph and a
output wire of gate g1 which enters as input wire to gate g2 indicates the edge (g1, g2) in the graph;
We compute a topological orderings of the graph, that is, if the output wire of gate g1 enters to
gate g2 then the index that g1 gets in the ordering is lower than the index of gate g2. (Note that
there might exist many valid topological ordering for the same graph). For the sake of the proof,
whenever we write gi we refer to the i
th gate in the topological ordering.
We define the hybrid Ht as the view in which the gates g1, g2, . . . , gt are computed as in proce-
dure P (i.e. the inactive entries are just random elements from (Fp)n) and the gates gt+1, . . . , g|G|
are computed as described in our protocol (Section 4.2). Observe that H0 is distributed exactly
as the view of the adversary in {REALOurA (x̄)}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj and H
|G| is distributed exactly as the view
of the adversary in {P(REALBMRA )}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj . Thus, by a hybrid argument it follows that there
exists an integer 0 ≤ z < |G| − 1 such that the distinguisher D can distinguish between the two
distributions Hz and Hz+1 with non-negligible probability ε′.
Let us take a closer look at the hybrids Hz and Hz+1: Let g be a gate from layer z + 1 with
input wires a, b and output wire c,
• If the view is taken fromHz+1 then the garbled table (Ag, Bg, Cg, Dg) is computed as described
in procedure P. That is, the external values Λa,Λb,Λc are known and thus the key kc,Λc is
encrypted using keys ka,Λa and kb,Λb in the 2Λa + Λb-th entry (the active entry) while the
other three (inactive) entries are independent of ka,Λa , kb,Λb , ka,Λ̄a and kb,Λ̄b (because P
chooses them at random from (Fp)n).
• If the view is taken from Hz then the garbled table of g is computed correctly for all the
four entries. Let g̃a be a gate whose output wire is a (which, as written above, is an input
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wire to gate g); note that by the topological ordering of the gates the index of g̃a has a
lower index than the index of g and thus there is exactly one entry (the active entry) in the
garbled table of g̃a which encrypts ka,Λa , while the other three (inactive) entries are random
values from (Fp)
n and therefore reveal no information about ka,Λa , and, more importantly,
no information about ka,Λ̄a . The same observation holds for the gate g̃b whose output wire
is b. Therefore the computation of the garbled table of gate g (recall that it is in layer z + 1
and we are currently looking at hybrid Hz) involves exactly one entry (i.e. the active entry)
which depends on both ka,Λa and kb,Λb while the other three (inactive) entries depend on
at least one of ka,Λ̄a and kb,Λ̄b , which the distinguisher D has no information about. Thus,
whenever a computation of F using a key from the vectors ka,Λ̄a or kb,Λ̄b is required in order
to compute the inactive entries of gate g (in the view Hz), we could use some other key k̃
instead; in particular, we could use F without even knowing k̃ at all, e.g. when working with
an oracle.
In the following analysis we exploit this observation: Since the distinguisher D has no informa-
tion about ka,Λ̄a or kb,Λ̄b , we can construct the garbled table using some other keys, and because
we are interested in the result of F under those keys (and not in the keys themselves) we can even
use an oracle to replace a PRF. Thus, if D distinguishes between Hz and Hz+1 then we can use
it to distinguish between an oracle to a pseudo-random function and an oracle to a truly random
function (under multiple invocations of the oracle, because there are 2n keys in the two vectors
ka,Λ̄a and kb,Λ̄b).
Let us first define the notion of a pseudo-random function under multiple keys:
Definition 1. Let F : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an efficient, length preserving, keyed function.
F is a pseudo-random function under multiple keys if for all polynomial time distinguishers D, there
is a negligible function neg such that:
|Pr[DFk̄(·)(1n) = 1]− Pr[Df̄(·)(1n) = 1]| ≤ neg(n)
where Fk̄ = Fk1 , . . . , Fkm(n) are the pseudo-random function F keyed with polynomial number
of randomly chosen keys k1, . . . , km(n) and f̄ = f1, . . . , fm(n) are m(n) random functions from
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The probability in both cases is taken over the randomness of D as well.
It is easy to see (by a hybrid argument) that if F is a pseudo-random function then it is a pseudo
random function under multiple keys. Thus, since the function F used in our protocol is a PRF
then for every polynomial time distinguisher D̃, every positive polynomial p and for all sufficiently
large κ:
|Pr[D̃Fk̄(·)(1κ) = 1]− Pr[D̃f̄(·)(1κ) = 1]| ≤ 1
p(κ)
(3)
We now present a reduction from the indistinguishability between Hz and Hz+1 to the indis-
tinguishability of the pseudo-random function F under multiple keys. Given the polynomial time
distinguisher D which distinguishes between Hz and Hz+1 with non-negligible probability ε′, we
construct a polynomial time distinguisher D′ who distinguishes between F under multiple keys
and a set of truly random functions (and thus contradicting the pseudo-randomness of F ). The
distinguisher D′ has an access to O = O1, . . . ,O2n (which is either a PRF under multiple keys or
a set of truly random functions). D′ acts as follows:
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1. Chooses keys and masking values for all players and wires, i.e. {kiw,b | w ∈ W, b ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈
{1, . . . , n}} and {λw | w ∈W}.
2. Constructs the gates g1, . . . , gz as described in procedure P, i.e. only the active entry is
calculated correctly, while the other three entries are taken to be random from (Fp)n.
3. Constructs the garbled table of gate gz+1 in the following manner: denote the input wires of
the gate by a, b and the output wire by c; we want that the key-vector kc,Λc be encrypted
using the key-vectors ka,Λa and kb,Λb and held in the 2Λa + Λb entry, thus:
• Whenever a result of F applied to the key kia,Λa is required, it is computed correctly as
in the protocol. (The same holds for the key kib,Λb).
• Whenever a result of F applied to the key ki
a,Λa
is required, the distinguisher D′ queries
the oracle Oi instead. (The same holds for the key kib,Λb ; here, however, the distinguisher
D′ queries the oracle On+i).
4. Completes the computation of the garbled circuit, i.e. the garbled tables of gates gz+2, . . . , g|G|,
correctly, as in the protocol.
5. Hands the resulting view to D and outputs whatever it outputs.
Observe that if O = Fk̄ then the view that D′ hands to D is distributed identically to Hz, while
if O = f̄ then the view that D′ hands to D is distributed identically to Hz+1. Thus:
|Pr[D′Fk̄(·)(1κ) = 1]− Pr[D′f̄(·)(1κ) = 1]| =
|Pr[D(Hz) = 1]− Pr[D(Hz+1) = 1]| = ε′
where ε′ is a non-negligible probability (as mentioned above), in contradiction to the pseudo-
randomness of F . We conclude that the assumption of the existence of D is incorrect and therefore
{REALOurA (x̄)}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj
c≡ {P(REALBMRA )}f,x̄,kiw,β ,λj
5.2 Security in the malicious model
When our protocol relies on SPDZ as its underlying MPC then the keys that each party sees are
guaranteed to be uniformly chosen from Fp and the masking values of all wires are guaranteed to
be random values from {0, 1}. Thus, the garbled circuit is guaranteed to be built correctly and
privately by the parties as a function of the original circuit C (which computes the functionality
f), the set of keys of all parties, the set of masking values of all wires and by the PRF results that
the parties apply to these keys. However, the elements of the last item (the PRF results) are not
guaranteed to be computed correctly (moreover, below we show that it is wasteful to verify the
correctness of their computation) and we must show that cheating in a PRF result(s) would cause
the honest parties to abort.
Specifically, there are two locations in which a maliciously corrupted party might deviate from the
protocol:
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• A corrupted party might cheat in the offline phase by inputing a false value as one (or more)
of the PRF results of its keys (i.e. PRF result that is not computed as described in the
protocol).
• A corrupted party Pc, to whom the circuit input wire w is attached, might cheat in the online
phase by sending the external value Λ′w 6= λw ⊕ ρw (i.e. Pc sends Λw).
It is clear that the second kind of behavior has the same effect as if the adversary inputs to the
functionality the value ρ̄w instead of ρw, since Λ̄w = λw ⊕ ρ̄w, and thus, this behavior is permitted
to a malicious adversary (i.e. a malicious adversary is able to change the input to the functional-
ity without being considered as a cheat since this behaviour is unavoidable even in the ideal model).
We break the proof of security in the malicious case into two steps: first we show that the
adversary cannot break the correctness of the protocol with more than negligible probability, and
then we use that result (of correctness) in order to show that the joint distributions of the output
of the parties in the ideal and real worlds are indistinguishable.
5.2.1 Correctness
Let us denote the event in which a corrupted party cheats by inputting a false PRF result in the
offline phase as cheat (the event refers to one corrupted party and we show below that even if only
one party cheats then the honest parties abort). In the following we prove the following claim:
Claim 4. A malicious adversary cannot break the correctness property of our protocol except with
negligible probability. Formally, denote the set of outputs of the honest parties in our protocol
as ΠJSFE and their outputs when computed by the functionality f as yJ , then for every positive
polynomial p and for sufficiently large κ it holds that
Pr[ΠJSFE 6= yJ ∧ΠJSFE 6= ⊥ | cheat] ≤
1
p(κ)
Proof. To harm the correctness property of the protocol, the adversary has to provide to the offline
phase incorrect results of F applied to its keys, such that the generated garbled circuit will cause
the honest parties to output some set of values that is different from yJ .
Let GCSH be the garbled circuit generated by the offline phase in the semi-honest model, i.e. when
the adversary provides the correct results of F , and let GCM be the garbled circuit resulted in
the malicious model (such that in both cases the random tape used by the underlying MPC, the
adversary and the parties is the same, that is, same keys and masking values are being used).
Observe that if the adversary succeeds in breaking the correctness then there must be at least
one wire c and at least one honest party Pj where the gate g has input wires a, b and output wire c,
such that in the evaluation of GCSH (in the online phase) the active signal that Pj sees is (v, k
j
c,v)
(where v = Λc is the external value) and in GCM the active signal is (v̄, k
j
c,v̄) (that is, the adversary
succeeded in flipping the signal that passes through wire c).
In the following analysis we provide the adversary with more power than it has in reality and
assume that it can predict, even before supplying its PRF results (i.e. in the offline phase), which
entries are going to be evaluated in the online phase (i.e. it knows the active path). For example,
it knows that for some gate g with input wires a, b and output wire c, Λa = Λb = 0 and thus the
active entry for gate g is Ag. In addition, observe that the success probability of the adversary (of
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breaking the correctness property) is independent for every gate, thus it is sufficient to calculate the
success probability of the adversary for a single gate and then multiply the result by the number
of gates in the circuit.
We first analyze the success probability of the adversary in breaking the correctness of the gate
g with input wires a, b and output wire c. Assume, without loss of generality, that the active entry
of gate g is Ag which is a vector of n elements from Fp, such that the j-th element of Ag is calculated






(0‖j ‖g) + Fkib,0(0‖j ‖g)
)
+ kjc,v (4)
Recall that J is the set of corrupted parties and J = [N ] r I. For simplicity define





(0‖j ‖g) + Fkib,0(0‖j ‖g)
)





(0‖j ‖g) + Fkib,0(0‖j ‖g)
)
i.e. Xj is the sum of the PRF results that the adversary provides and Y j is the sum of the PRF
results that the honest player provides. Thus, rewriting equation (4) we obtain
Ajg = X
j + Y j + kjc,v
In order to break the correctness of gate g, the adversary has to flip the active signal for at least
one j ∈ J (i.e. for at least one honest party), that is, the adversary has to provide false PRF results
X̃j such that
Ãjg = X̃
j + Y j + kjc,v̄
Let ∆j be the difference between the two hidden keys, i.e. ∆j = kjc,v − kjc,v̄ mod p, then it follows
that kjc,v̄ = k
j
c,v −∆j mod p and thus in order to make the honest party Pj evaluate the key kjc,v̄
instead of the key kjc,v the adversary has to set X̃ = X −∆j . Then it holds that
X̃ + Y + kjc,v = X −∆j + Y + kjc,v
= X + Y + kjc,v̄
= Ãjg
as required and the j-th element (which actually verified by Pj) will be flipped. Observe that in
order to succeed the adversary has to find ∆j . But, since kjc,v and k
j
c,v̄ are random elements from
Fp, the value ∆j is also a random element from Fp. Note that the adversary provides all the PRF
result before the garbled circuit and the garbled inputs are revealed and thus the values that it
provides are independent of the garbled circuit (in particular, they are independent of the keys kjc,v
and kjc,v̄). Note that the same analysis holds for the entries Bg, Cg, Dg as well.
Let flipped-g be the event in which the adversary succeeds in flipping the signal for at least one
honest party Pj in the active entry of gate g, it follows that:









Now, assume that when the adversary guesses a wrong ∆j for some entry of some gate, the
parties do not abort and somehow can keep evaluating the circuit using the correct key; then the
probability of the adversary breaking the correctness of the protocol is just a sum of its success
probability for all gates. Let t be a polynomial such that t(κ) is an upper bound for the number of
gates in the circuit, then by union bound we get:






for every positive polynomial q.
5.2.2 Emulation in the ideal model.
Next, we describe the ideal model in which the adversary’s view will be emulated, and we show
the existence of a simulator S ′OUR in the malicious model which uses the simulator SOUR in the
semi-honest model. The ideal model is as follows:
Inputs. The parties send their inputs (x̄) to the trusted party.
Function computed. The trusted party computes f(x̄).
Adversary decides. The adversary gets the output yI and sends to the trusted party whether
to ‘continue’ or ‘halt’. If ‘continue’ then the trusted party sends to the honest parties PJ the
output yJ , otherwise the trusted party sends abort to players PJ .
Outputs. The honest parties output whatever the trusted party sent them while the corrupted
parties output nothing. The adversary A outputs any arbitrary (PPT) function of the initial
input of the corrupted parties and the value yJ obtained from the trusted party.
The reason that the adversary may decide whether the honest parties obtain the output or not
is due to the fact that guaranteed output delivery and fairness cannot be achieved with dishonest
majority in the general case (as shown in [8]).
The ideal execution of f on inputs x̄ and corrupted parties PI (that are controlled by adversary
A) is denoted by IDEALfA,I(x̄) and the real execution is denoted by REAL-MALOurA,I (x̄); in both cases
they refer to the joint distribution of the outputs of all parties. (In the following proof we use
REALOurA (x̄) to refer to the real execution in the semi-honest model).
Proof outline. In the following proof we make use of two procedures, P ′ (which is close to
procedure P) and H. The procedure P ′ is given a view of the adversary in the semi-honest model
(or a view that is indistinguishable from it, e.g. a simulated view) and a set of keys KI, and outputs
the exact same view, with the exception that the keys that are opened to the adversary are now
KI. The procedure H is given a view of the adversary in the semi-honest model (or a view that
is indistinguishable from it) and a set of PRF results FI, and outputs the exact same view, with
the exception that it applies the set of PRF results FI to the view as if the adversary has provided
them in the real execution of the protocol (that is, the set FI affects the exact same locations in
the input view that it would have affect it in a real execution of the protocol in the malicious model).
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The simulator S ′OUR will engage in the ideal computation such that it only gives the input xI to
the trusted party and then receives the output yI . The simulator S ′OUR also instructs the trusted
party whether to abort or not (i.e. whether to send the honest parties their output). The output
of the parties (all of them) in the ideal settings must be indistinguishable from their output in the
real execution of our protocol.
The idea of the simulation method is that we can use the fact that there exist a simulator SOUR
in the semi-honest model which can construct a garbled circuit that is indistinguishable from the
one constructed by our protocol in the semi-honest model. By internally running A, the simulator
S ′OUR can extract the inputs of the adversary x̄, the keys KI that were opened to it and the exact
locations in whichA has cheated (that is, the set FI of PRF results that it provides given that the set
of keys that it sees are KI). Hence, using the procedures P ′ and H, the simulator S ′OUR can tweak
the garbled circuit which resulted by SOUR in the specific locations to match the garbled circuit.
The procedure P ′. Let us define the procedure P ′ (Procedure 2) which receives as input a view
simulated by SOUR or a real view of the adversary in the semi-honest model (REALOurA (x̄)), along
with a set of keys KI = {kiw,j | i ∈ I, w ∈ W, j ∈ {0, 1}} (i.e. two keys per wire per corrupted
party) and rebuilds the garbled circuit just as P did (in the semi-honest case), but instead of using
random keys of its choice it uses the keys received as input for the corrupted parties I. Even
though Procedure P was originally used to transform a view of the BMR execution into a view of
the execution of our protocol, we can use it to transform a view of our protocol into another view
of our protocol (e.g. by only changing the keys); this is exactly what we do in the simulation.
Procedure 2 (The Procedure P ′).
Input.
• A view v taken from distribution REALOurA (x̄) or the output of SOUR.
• A set of keys KI = {kiw,j | i ∈ I, w ∈W, j ∈ {0, 1}}
Output. A view v′ which is the same as v, but in v the garbled circuit is built using the set of
keys KI from the input.
Execute procedure P on v with the exception that in step 3a use the keys KI given as input rather
than choosing new ones for every key of parties I.
Claim 5. Denote by REALOurA (x̄)(x̄) the view of the semi-honest adversary in our protocol when the
inputs of the parties are x̄, and denote by P ′(REALOurA (x̄)(x̄),KI) the result of procedure P ′ applied
on REALOurA (x̄)(x̄) using the keys KI; then, given that the keys in KI are chosen uniformly from Fp




c≡ P ′(REALOurA (x̄),KI) (5)
Proof. The proof follows identically the proof of Claim 2.
Corollary 5.1. Given that the keys in KI are chosen uniformly from Fp, the probability ensemble
of the view in the semi-honest model REALOurA (x̄) and the view when procedure P ′ applied on it (using
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Procedure 3 (The Procedure H).
Input. A view v taken from distribution REALOurA (x̄) under the input x̄; and a set of PRF results
FI of F applied to the set of keys of parties {Pi}i∈I (that is, 2n PRF results for every key
{kiw,j | i ∈ I, w ∈W, j ∈ {0, 1}}
Output. A view v′ conforming to the message flow in REALOurA (x̄) but with modified garbled
gates according to FI.
The view v contains all the keys belonging to the corrupted parties I, thus the procedure can tell
which of the PRF results in FI are computed correctly and which are not. Recall that FI can be
seen as a set of vectors from (Fp)n, formally, we denote the values in FI as follows (where g is the
gate to which wire w enters):
{F̃kiw,b(0 ‖ 1 ‖ g), . . . , F̃kiw,b(0 ‖ n ‖ g)}i∈I,w∈W,b∈{0,1}
{F̃kiw,b(1 ‖ 1 ‖ g), . . . , F̃kiw,b(1 ‖ n ‖ g)}i∈I,w∈W,b∈{0,1}
while the correct PRF values as:
{Fkiw,b(0‖1‖g), . . . , Fkiw,b(0‖n‖g)}i∈I,w∈W,b∈{0,1}
{Fkiw,b(1‖1‖g), . . . , Fkiw,b(1‖n‖g)}i∈I,w∈W,b∈{0,1}
The procedure changes the garbled gates in the view as follows:
Let g be a gate with input wires a, b and output wire c, from Functionality 4 we can see that
F̃kia,0(0 ‖ j ‖ g) influences A
j
g F̃kib,0(0 ‖ j ‖ g) influences A
j
g
F̃kia,0(1 ‖ j ‖ g) influences B
j
g F̃kib,1(0 ‖ j ‖ g) influences B
j
g
F̃kia,1(0 ‖ j ‖ g) influences C
j
g F̃kib,0(1 ‖ j ‖ g) influences C
j
g
F̃kia,1(1 ‖ j ‖ g) influences D
j
g F̃kib,1(1 ‖ j ‖ g) influences D
j
g
Thus, for every F̃kiw,b(α ‖ β ‖ γ) of the above, the procedure computes the correct value Fkiw,b(α‖
β ‖γ). Then it computes the difference
F∆kiw,b
(α ‖ β ‖ γ) = F̃kiw,b(α ‖ β ‖ γ)− Fkiw,b(α‖β ‖γ)
Finally, it adds that difference to the appropriate coordinate in one of the vectors Ag, Bg, Cg, Dg
as described above. For instance. let F∆
kia,0
(0 ‖ j ‖ g) = F̃kia,0(0 ‖ j ‖ g)− Fkia,0(0‖ j ‖g) then the
procedure adds F∆
kia,0
(0 ‖ j ‖ g) to the value Ag given in v.
When done with those changes, the procedure outputs the resulted view v′.
The procedure H. We now define the procedure H (Procedure 3) which is given a view from
the distribution REALOurA (x̄) and a set of PRF results FI (computed correctly or not) for every
key of parties {Pi}i∈I . The procedure returns a corresponding view in which the garbled circuit is
computed as if it was computed in a real execution of our protocol where the adversary inputs in
the offline phase the PRF results FI.
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Let KI, as before, be the set of keys generated for the corrupted parties in the offline phase,
and λI be the set of masking values generated for the circuit output wires and for the wires that are
attached to the corrupted parties (i.e. the masking values that are in the adversary’s view). Note
that the PRF results that the corrupted parties input to the functionality (in the offline phase)
depend only on the adversary’s random tape r, and on the keys and masking values outputted
to them from the undelying MPC. That is, the PRF results that they provide can be seen as
A(r,KI, λI). Since the PRF results that the corrupted parties input to the functionality influence
only the resulted garbled gates, in the exact same manner as described in Procedure H; we get the
following:
Claim 6. Let REAL-MALOurA,I (x̄)KI,FI
be the view of the adversary (not the joint-view of all parties)
in the execution of our protocol in the malicious model where the keys that the adversary sees are
KI, and the PRF results that it provides are FI. Similarly, let REAL
Our
A (x̄)KI be the view of the
adversary in the execution of our protocol in the semi-honest model where the keys that it sees are




≡ H(REALOurA (x̄)KI ,FI) = H(REAL
Our
A (x̄)KI ,A(r,KI, λI)) (7)
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the definition of the procedure H.
The simulator S ′OUR. As mentioned earlier, the simulator S ′OUR uses the procedures H and P ′
described above:
1. The simulator S ′OUR runs our protocol internally such that it takes the role of the honest
parties PJ and the trusted party, and uses the algorithm A to control the parties PI . The
simulator halts the internal execution right after it receives the external values ΛI to all
the corrupted parties in the online phase (that is, it halts after Step 4 of the online phase of
Protocol 2). From the internal execution the simulator S ′OUR can extract (learn) the following
values:
(a) The keys kIw,0, k
I





since S ′OUR is the trusted party who chooses them) for every wire w.
(b) Masking values λ for all wires, in particular, the masking values of the circuit-input
wires that are attached to PI , i.e. λI.
(c) The values FI, i.e. 2n results for every key. Since S ′OUR is the trusted party in the internal
execution, it also knows the PRF results for the honest parties’ keys. We denote the
set of PRF results (for all keys, both adversary’s and honest party’s) as F. Moreover,
observe that S ′OUR can check whether A has cheated in FI.
(d) From λI and ΛI the simulator S ′OUR can conclude A’s input to the functionality xI .
2. Now, focusing on the ideal world, the honest parties and S ′OUR (this time as the adversary)
send their inputs to the trusted party. S ′OUR sends xI (that was extracted earlier).
3. The simulator S ′OUR receives the output yI from the trusted party.
4. S ′OUR now knows A’s input to the functionality xI and the output of f on xI and xJ (where
xJ remains hidden to it), it computes v = SOUR(1κ, I, xI , yI).
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5. The simulator S ′OUR computes v′ = P ′(v,KI).
6. The simulator S ′OUR computes v′′ = H(v′,FI) (note that FI = A(r,KI, λI)).
7. Having the modified view v′′ and the garbled circuit GCM within it, S ′OUR now evaluates the
circuit on behalf of the honest players with the inputs xI and xJ = 0
|J |.12 If these parties
abort then S ′OUR instructs the trusted party to not send the output yJ to PJ (i.e. to output
⊥). Otherwise, if the evaluation succeeds then S ′OUR instructs the trusted party to output
the correct output yJ .
13
8. The simulator S ′OUR outputs the view v′′ as the adversary’s simulated output.
Indistinguishability: Real vs. Ideal. To complete the proof of security in the malicious model
we have to prove the following:
Claim 7. The distribution ensemble of the output of the parties under the simulation of S ′OUR and
under the real execution of our protocol are indistinguishable.
Formally, let {REAL-MALOurA,I (x̄)}x̄ be the probability ensemble (indexed by the inputs of the parties)




A (x̄)}x̄ be the probability ensemble of their view in the execution aided by a






Proof. Immediate from the proof of Claim 8. That is, in Claim 8 we state the same thing, and
prove it for every possible set of inputs of the players x̄.








Proof. Let V AREAL-MAL(x̄) be the view of the adversary in the real execution of our protocol (i.e.
the view of the adversary that is taken from REAL-MALOurA,I (x̄)) and V
A,S′OUR
IDEAL (x̄) be the view of the
adversary that the simulator SOUR′ outputs; also, let OJREAL-MAL(x̄) be the output of the honest
parties in the real execution of the protocol and O
J,S′OUR
IDEAL (x̄) be their output in the ideal model.












IDEAL (x̄) (which is proven in Claim 9) we now prove the above by
a reduction. Assume by contradiction that there exist a PPT distinguisher D and a non-negligible
function ε in κ such that




IDEAL (x̄)}) = 1]| = ε(κ)
12Note that the correctness property shown earlier holds for every input of the honest parties xJ , thus, in order to
decide whether to instruct the trusted party to ’halt’ or ’continue’ S ′OUR can just use some fake input xJ = 0|J|.
13The decision whether to abort or not is not based on whether the adversary cheated or not, but is rather based
on the actual evaluation of the circuit because there might be cases where the adversary cheats and influence only
the corrupted parties. E.g., when cheating in i-th PRF values used in a garbled gate of some gate whose output wire
is a circuit output wire (where i ∈ I).
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we describe a distinguisher D′ that is able to distinguish between V AREAL-MAL(x̄) and V
A,S′OUR
IDEAL (x̄)
with non-negligible probability; note that since we prove the above for every choice of x̄ the distin-
guisher may use x̄ in its algorithm. The distinguisher D′ act as follows:
1. The distinguisher D′ is given a view v of the adversary which is either from a real execution
of the protocol or a simulated view, i.e. either V AREAL-MAL(x̄) or V
A,S′OUR
IDEAL (x̄).
2. The view v contains the garbled circuit constructed either by the players or by the simulator,
moreover, as mentioned above, D′ knows the inputs of all parties (because we prove the claim
for specific choice of x̄), thus, D′ evaluate the circuit using x̄ and assign the output of the
honest parties into yJ .
3. The distinguisher D′ hands {v, yJ} to D and outputs whatever it outputs.
From the correctness property shown in the proof of Claim 4 it follows that if v has been
taken from V AREAL-MAL(x̄) then {v, yJ} and {V AREAL-MAL(x̄), OJREAL-MAL(x̄)} are indistinguishable,
otherwise, if v has been taken from V
A,S′OUR





indistinguishable due to the simple fact that the distinguisher D′ does exactly what the honest
parties do in the real execution. Formally:






IDEAL (x̄)}) = 1]− Pr[D
′(V
A,S′OUR
IDEAL (x̄)) = 1]| = ε3(κ)
where ε2(κ) and ε3(κ) are negligible. It follows that








IDEAL (x̄)}) = 1]| − ε3(κ)
and thus
Pr[D′(V AREAL-MAL(x̄)) = 1]− Pr[D′(V
A,S′OUR
IDEAL (x̄)) = 1] = ε(κ)− ε2(κ) + ε3(κ)
which is non-negligible, in contradiction to the result in Claim 9.
Claim 9. Let V AREAL-MAL(x̄) be the view of the adversary in the real execution of our protocol and
V
A,S′OUR
IDEAL (x̄) be the view of the adversary outputted by the simulator SOUR
′ such that in both cases










≡ H(REALOurA (x̄)KI ,FI)
c≡ H(P ′(REALOurA (x̄)KI),FI)
c≡ H(P ′(SOUR(1κ, I, xI , yI)KI),FI)
Where the first equality is given from Equation 7, the second follows from 5 and the third follows
from the operation of the simulator of the semi-honest model. That is, if there exist a distinguisher
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who succeed to distinguish between V AREAL-MAL(x̄) and V
A,S′OUR
IDEAL (x̄) with non-negligible probability
then we can easily construct a distinguisher who is able to distinguish between REALOurA (x̄) and
SOUR(1κ, I, xI , yI) in contradiction to the security in the semi-honest model.
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A A Generic Protocol to Implement Foffline
In this Appendix we give a generic protocol Πoffline which implements Foffline using any protocol
which implements the generic MPC functionality FMPC. The protocol is very similar to the protocol
in the main body which is based on the SPDZ protocol, however this generic functionality requires
more rounds of communication (but still requires constant rounds). Phase Two is implemented
exactly as in Section 4, so the only change we need is to alter the implementation of Phase One;
which is implemented as follows:
1. Initialize the MPC Engine: Call Initialize on the functionality FMPC with input p, a prime
with 2κ < p < 2κ+1.
2. Generate wire masks: For every circuit wire w we need to generate a sharing of the (secret)
masking-values λw. Thus for all wires w the players execute the following commands
• Player i calls InputData on the functionality FMPC for a random value λiw of his choosing.









[τw] = [µw] · [µw]− 1.
• The players open [τw] and if τw 6= 0 for any wire w they abort.
3. Generate garbled wire values: For every wire w, each party i ∈ [1, . . . , n] and for j ∈ {0, 1},
player i generates a random value kiw,j ∈ Fp and call InputData on the functionality FMPC so




i=1 we shall denote by [kw,j ].
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